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Abstract
This contribution embeds the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis in a general equilib-
rium model that combines monopolistic competition and markup variations to examine
the determinants of relative prices of nontradables. The model emphasizes the role of
markup variations as an important aspect driving relative price movements. Variations
in the markup makes ﬁscal policy non-neutral and provides a strong magniﬁcation
mechanism for shocks to productivity. The empirical evidence of these predictions are
examined by using a panel cointegration framework. On the whole, the econometric
ﬁndings support theoretical implications, suggesting that our model is more closely in
line with data relative to the supply-side Balassa-Samuelson framework that abstracts
from variations in the degree of competition.
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11 Introduction
More than forty-ﬁve years ago, Balassa [1964] and Samuelson [1964] developed an elegant
and tractable model for addressing international prices discrepancies in a static environment
characterized by perfect competition and frictionless markets. Their key insight is to identify
variations in total factor productivity diﬀerentials between traded and non traded goods
sectors to be the only exogenous driving force for relative prices. That interpretation has
an important corollary: being determined independently of optimal intertemporal decisions
by households and the government, the equilibrium path of the relative price requires only
a description of the supply-side of the economy. Hence, the model embraces the dichotomy
between supply and demand sides of the economy and accepts the complete irrelevance
of ﬁscal policy with respect to relative prices. This result arises since the model assumes
neoclassical hypotheses: an exogenous interest rate, perfect competition, the law of one price
for tradable goods, constant returns to scale, and perfect mobility of factors across sectors.
Both its reliance on technological disturbances as the primary source of relative prices
ﬂuctuations and its reliance on the strong assumptions above are, however, potential weak-
nesses encountered by the Balassa-Samuelson model. That belief is underpinned by a large
body of theoretical work which aims to reformulate the intuitive arguments of the Balassa-
Samuelson theory within a micro-founded intertemporal framework featuring market failures
or nominal rigidities. Early examples are Rogoﬀ [1992] and De Gregorio et al. [1994a] who
emphasize that imperfect factors mobility across sectors and wage rigidities may generate
eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks on the relative price. A more recent strand of the international
macroeconomic literature allows for an endogenous Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect by assuming
ﬁrms entry (Ghironi and Melitz [2005]), endogenous tradability (Bergin et al. [2006]) or
spatial distribution of ﬁrms (M´ ejean [2008]). In addition to these ineﬃciencies, the present
model combines monopolistic competition and markup variations, as a means for generating
departures from the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. This framework allows us to investi-
gate, both theoretically and empirically, the general equilibrium link between the relative
price and exogenous shocks to productivity and government spending in a framework that
encompasses variation in the degree of competition.
On the theoretical side, the contribution of the paper is to embed the static Balassa-
Samuelson hypothesis in an explicitly dynamic general equilibrium model where variations in
the composition of demand for nontradables give rise to endogenous changes in the markup.
Within the non traded goods sector, preferences are such that the price elasticity of demand
faced by the typical ﬁrm and consequently its markup are related to the relative weight of
government spending in demand for nontradables. In this model, the relative price level
results therefore from the general equilibrium outcome of the economy. As a result, any
shock to agents’ environments which generates an endogenous markup variations gives rise
to changes in the relative price. Thus, variation in the degree of competition provides a
channel through which the direct impact of macroeconomic shocks is transmitted.
The model carries two theoretical implications for the relative price of non traded goods.
The ﬁrst ﬁnding is that positive ﬁscal shocks lead to persistent relative price appreciations.
Within this framework, all the eﬀects of government expenditure changes are channelled
2through markup variations, the key new driving force in the model. With composition
eﬀects, an increase in domestic government spending enlarges the importance of the price-
inelastic component of demand causing a fall in the price elasticity. This provides an in-
centive for monopolistic producers to increase markups and prices. In this way, the model
matches the evidence stemming from the recent empirical research.1 The second implication
indicates that the variation in the markup provides a powerful magniﬁcation mechanism for
shocks to productivity. Speciﬁcally, the default to account for the markup response to tech-
nological shocks leads to understate their true eﬀects. Indeed, we show that monopolistic
ﬁrms respond to productivity shocks in either tradables or nontradables sector by modify-
ing markups. This eﬀect feedbacks in turn to the relative price and exacerbates the direct
impact of the shocks. Based on the quantitative properties of the framework, it is estimated
that around 28% of the variation in the relative price induced by a technology shock in the
non traded goods sector can be attributed to the endogenous markup variation mechanism.
The empirical part of the paper uses data for a panel of thirteen OECD economies over
1970-2004 to investigate the model’s theoretical implications. Before presenting the results in
more detail, it is worth emphasizing that the model provides one reﬁnement to augment the
standard empirical estimates of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. A potential concern with
these estimates is that Solow residuals, used commonly to measure total factor productivity
gains (TFP for short), contain measurement error owing to the presence of monopoly power.2
This drawback motivates our alternative measure which accounts for that nuisance element.
We ﬁrst test the predictions of the Balassa-Samuelson framework using Solow residuals for
purposes of comparability. Although the model correctly predicts the direction of the eﬀects
of sectoral TFPs on the relative price, it does not correctly predict the magnitude because
of measurement errors. When using our relevant productivity proxy, coeﬃcient estimates on
sectoral productivity fall dramatically, suggesting that previous standard Balassa-Samuelson
estimates have been misspeciﬁed.
The second part of the empirical investigation tests model’s predictions by including
proxies for product market competition and ﬁscal policy as additional explanatory vari-
ables. These two factors are found to be signiﬁcant and robust determinants of relative
prices, in accordance with the theoretical results above. In particular, our ﬁndings uncover
that expansive ﬁscal policies tend to fuel nontradables inﬂation, while deregulation policies
may provide disinﬂation gains. Moreover, controlling for product market competition lowers
signiﬁcantly the estimated eﬀects of productivity in nontradables, in a manner consistent
with model’s predictions. This result explains why less competitive economies may experi-
ence higher inﬂation since transmission mechanisms of productivity gains in nontradables
into relative price reductions are eroded by increases in markups.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the benchmark
two-sector model. Section 3 discusses transmission mechanisms of ﬁscal and technological
shocks to the relative price of nontradables. In section 4, we conduct a numerical analysis.
Section 5 presents our econometric results. The ﬁnal section 6 concludes.
1See Froot and Rogoﬀ [1991], De Gregorio et al. ([1994a], [1994b]) and Balvers and Bergstrand [2002].
2De Gregorio et al. [1994b], Kakkar [2003], Lee and Tang [2007] and MacDonald and Ricci [2007] 1992),
among others, have employed Solow residuals to measure productivity.
32 The framework
Consider a small open economy populated by a representative household, ﬁrms and a gov-
ernment. There are two sectors in the economy producing an homogeneous traded good T
and a diﬀerentiated non traded good N. The traded good serves as the numeraire (pT = 1)
and the law of one price prevails in that sector. The model features two distinct roles for
non traded goods: as ﬁnal consumption and as an input into the production of traded and
non traded goods.3
2.1 Households and government
The representative household gains utility from its consumption c and experiences disutility











where β ∈ (0,1) denotes the consumer’s discount rate, σ > 0 the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, σL > 0 the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and γ is a positive scaling
parameter of disutility of work. The composite consumption good is a CES aggregate of





+ (1 − ϕ)1/φ ￿
cN￿(φ−1)/φiφ/(φ−1)
, (2)
where ϕ ∈ (0,1) parameterizes the relative importance of traded and non traded goods in
consumption, and φ > 0 reﬂects the intratemporal elasticity of substitution. The preferences







with θ > 1 is the symmetric elasticity of substitution across non traded goods.
The household decision problem is solved by the means of two-stage budgeting. In the
ﬁrst stage, the consumer chooses a time proﬁle for consumption, labor supply and ﬁnancial
assets a(t) to maximize the utility function (1) subject to her/his budget constraint:
˙ a(t) = r∗a(t) + Π(t) + w(t)L(t) − πc(t)c(t) − Z(t), (4)
where r∗ is the exogenous world interest rate, Π the proﬁt income, w the real wage, πc is the
consumption-based price index and Z denotes lump-sum taxes.4 Letting λ be the shadow
value of wealth, the ﬁrst-order conditions characterizing the household’s optimal plans are
uc = λπc, (5a)
uL = −λw, (5b)
˙ λ = λ(β − r∗), (5c)
3Brock and Turnovsky [1994] develop a model in which capital goods are either traded or non traded.
They ﬁnd that it is the relative sectoral intensity of nontradable capital that matters for model’s dynamics.
4In this setup, dots indicate time derivatives, while subindexes denote the variable with respect to which
the derivative is taken.
4and the appropriate transversality condition. With a constant rate of time preference and
an exogenous interest rate, from equation (5c) we require that β = r∗ in order to ensure the
existence of a meaningful steady-state. This standard assumption implies that the marginal
utility of wealth must remain constant over time and is always at its steady state level,
that is, λ = ¯ λ. Given the optimal level for c, the cost-minimizing intratemporal allocation
between traded and non traded goods follows immediately from Shephard’s lemma, and
gives the standard demand for each good:
cT = (1 − α)πcc and pcN = απcc, (6)
where α ∈ (0,1) is the share of consumption expenditure spent on non traded goods, and p
the relative price of the composite non traded goods (see below).
In the second stage, total non traded consumption is allocated between varieties. Given
the relative price of each non traded variety p(z), the demand function for each commod-
ity cN(z) and the relative price index p are obtained by solving a standard expenditure












Finally, the government follows a balanced budget policy by collecting lump-sum taxes Z




p(z)gN(z)dz = Z. (8)
2.2 Firms
Domestic ﬁrms in sector j (j = T,N) rent capital, Kj, and hire labor, Lj, to produce
output, Y j, employing neoclassical production functions which feature constant returns to
scale. Both inputs can move freely between sectors and thus attract the same rental rates




KN(z)dz = K and LT +
Z 1
0
LN(z)dz = L. (9)
The low of motion for aggregate capital accumulation is
˙ K(t) = IN(t) − δK(t), (10)
where IN is gross investment and δ ∈ (0,1) is the rate of depreciation of capital. Investment







The expenditure minimization problem, analogous to the one described above for cN, yields







and a price index for investment goods similar to (7).
52.2.1 Traded sector
Output in the traded sector Y T is obtained according to the following technology:









where AT denotes the productivity shift speciﬁc to this sector and αT ∈ (0,1) the output







/LT with kT = KT/LT, proﬁt maximization in the traded sector satisﬁes




where ωK is the rental rate on capital, w denotes the wage for a worker and fk is the
marginal product of capital. Pure proﬁts in this sector are zero (ΠT = 0).
2.2.2 Non traded sector
The non traded goods sector is characterized by the presence of monopolistically competitive
ﬁrms which are distributed along the unit interval. Each ﬁrm z produces output Y N(z) by
using capital KN(z) and labor LN(z) and faces the following production function












where AN is the disturbance to total factor productivity in that sector and αN ∈ (0,1) the
labor’s share in income (both are assumed to be common to all ﬁrms). Each ﬁrm z chooses
paths for KN(z) and LN(z) in order to maximize proﬁts subject to demand curves (7) and
(12), and the non traded goods market clearing condition, Y N(z) = cN(z)+IN(z)+gN(z).
The ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem yield:




where kN(z) = KN(z)/LN(z) and µN(z) is the ﬁrm’s optimal markup.5 Conditions (16)
indicate that the markup drives a wedge between marginal products and rental rates.
Proﬁt maximization by price-setting ﬁrms implies a markup that depends on the com-
position of aggregate demand. The total demand for the good z is the sum of the demands
coming from consumers, ﬁrms, and the government. Accordingly, the price elasticity of
demand schedule ξ(z) is a weighted-average of individual elasticities. Public expenditure











The second equality in equation (17) implicity deﬁnes the markup as a function of individual
price elasticity, θ, and the composition of the demand faced by ﬁrm z (reﬂected by the
share of government spending in non traded output gN(z)/Y N(z)).6 In particular, the
5When choosing labor and capital to maximize proﬁts, the representative ﬁrm z takes ωK, ωL and output
of other ﬁrms as given (this is the Cournot-Nash assumption).
6The ﬁrst equality in (17) is obtained by plugging the non traded goods market clearing condition,
cN(z)+IN(z) = Y N(z)−gN(z), in the standard deﬁnition of ξ(z) which is ξ(z) = θ(cN(z)+IN(z))/Y N(z).
Furthermore, for the ﬁrms’ problem to have an interior solution, we proceed by assuming that ξ(z) > 1.
6markup is a monotonically decreasing function of the price elasticity. The higher is θ, the
better substitutes the varieties are for each other and the closer is the markup to unity.
Therefore, our framework nests the perfectly competitive Balassa-Samuelson model as a
limiting case. In addition, the markup varies endogenously in response to shifts in the
composition of aggregate demand faced by ﬁrm z as µN(z) is a monotonically increasing
function of gN(z)/Y N(z). This originates from the fact that when public demand increases,
the relative importance of the price-inelastic component of demand falls and the monopolistic
ﬁrm z is inclined to charge a higher markup as a greater part of aggregate demand does
not react to a relative price increase. Finally, proﬁts are positive and given by ΠN(z) =
(p(z)/µN(z))(µN(z) − 1)Y N(z) > 0.
The model is completely symmetric and all ﬁrms face the same price elasticity and
technology (implying that kN(z) = kN). Hence, all non competitive producers adopt the
same markup µN(z) = µN and thus set the same price p(z) = p for all z.
2.3 Macroeconomic equilibrium and dynamics
The model is closed by writing the law of motion for the relative price in the form
ANhk




This condition is obtained by noting that the two assets in the economy are perfect substi-
tutes. Agents are indiﬀerent between foreign bonds (which pay the exogenous world interest
rate r∗) and domestic capital (which yield the rate of return rK) if and only if their rate of
return equalize: r∗ = rK + ˙ p/p with p(rK + δ) = ωK.7 The general equilibrium satisﬁes
(5a)-(5b), (9), (18) and the following equations:








˙ K = Y N − cN − gN − δK, (19c)
˙ b = r∗b + Y T − cT − gT. (19d)
Equations (19a) and (19b) equate the marginal physical products of capital and labor in
the two sectors. Equation (19c) is the non traded good market clearing condition. Equation
(19d) which describes the current account, is obtained by noting that ﬁnancial wealth a
equals the sum of domestic capital stock and traded bonds holding b, that is a = b + pK.
The complete macroeconomic equilibrium can be performed by computing the model’s
dynamics which are comprised by equations (18), (19c) and (19d). This dynamic system is
block recursive so that time paths of p and K are computed independently of the foreign
asset stock b. As is usual in two-sector models, the qualitative economy’s dynamic behavior
depends upon relative sectoral capital intensity, and the two cases kT > kN and kN > kT
need to be analyzed separately. Using standard techniques, it can be shown that the system
associated with the pair of equations ˙ p(t) and ˙ K(t) yields an unique stable saddle-path,
7The condition p(rK + δ) = ωK can be formally obtained from a standard optimization program con-
sisting in maximizing the present value of cash ﬂows from capital stock (see Bettendorf and Heijdra [2006]).
7irrespective of the relative sizes of capital-labor ratios.8 Having computed the stable paths
for K(t) and p(t), the adjustment of the foreign asset stock b(t) immediately follows.
2.4 The steady-state
The steady-state (denoted by tilde) is reached when ˙ p = ˙ K = ˙ b = 0. It is obtained from
(5a)-(5b), (6), (9), (17), (19a)-(19b) and the following set of equations:
ANhk(˜ kN) = ˜ µN(r∗ + δ), (20a)
˜ LNh(˜ kN) − ˜ cN − gN − δ ˜ K = 0, (20b)
r∗˜ b + ˜ LTf(˜ kT) − ˜ cT − gT = 0, (20c)
together with the intertemporal budget constraint
(˜ b − b0) = Ω ( ˜ K − K0), (20d)
where b0 and K0 denote initial conditions and Ω < 0 describes the trade-oﬀ between capital
and net foreign assets. The steady-state forms a system of thirteen equations in thirteen
endogenous variables: ˜ c, ˜ cT, ˜ cN, ˜ L, ˜ LT, ˜ LN, ˜ kT, ˜ kN, ˜ K, ˜ b, ¯ λ, ˜ µN and ˜ p. Equation (20a)
entails that the rate of return on domestic capital ties the world interest rate. Equations
(20b) and (20c) are the resource constraints for non traded and traded goods respectively.
Finally, equation (20d) ensures that the country remains intertemporally solvent.
3 Implications for the relative price
One model’s virtue is to nest the Balassa-Samuelson framework in which θ → ∞ so that
˜ µN = 1. By diﬀerentiating the perfect competition counterpart of equation (20a), that is
ANhk(˜ kN) = (r∗ + δ), and by making use of (19a)-(19b), the textbook Balassa-Samuelson
principle is derived in the form:






where a hat denote percentage deviations from initial steady-state. Equation (21) highlights
that movements in the relative price are solely determined by the diﬀerential between TFP
in the traded sector and TFP (appropriately adjusted) in the non traded sector.9 This
property stems from the fact that the Balassa-Samuelson model embraces the neoclassical
assumptions that the interest rate is exogenous, the law of one price for tradable goods holds,
there are constant returns to scale and perfect mobility of factors across sectors, and perfect
competition prevails in goods markets. Assuming these conditions leads to the dichotomy
between supply and demand sides of the economy. Capital-labor ratio in sectors T and N,
real wage rate and relative price of non traded goods are determined by the supply-side block
8Equilibrium dynamics, not reported here to conserve space, can be retrieved in a technical appendix
available from the author upon request.
9The reader familiar with the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis may be concerned about the particular form
taken by equation (21). Indeed, the extent to which the relative price responds to productivity diﬀerentials
depends on the manner to treat investment in the model. Assuming that only the traded good is used for
investment, one may obtain the more familiar Balassa-Samuelson relationship ˆ p = (αN/αT) ˆ AT − ˆ AN.
8of the model. Labor, consumption and accumulations of capital and foreign bonds are then
determined by the general equilibrium in goods and labor markets. This classical view of
the two-sector economy suggests that, demand disturbances, including government spending
shocks, are irrelevant since productivity diﬀerentials determine entirely the domestic relative
price of non traded goods. Some departure from above assumptions is required for destroy
this dichotomy and allow for an eﬀect of demand factors on the relative price.
Not surprisingly, important diﬀerences with respect to the standard Balassa-Samuelson
hypothesis emerge in the present two-sector model. Indeed, once an endogenous markup
pricing rule is admitted into the framework, the dichotomy and the irrelevance of ﬁscal
policy quickly disappear. Formally, the system (20) describing the equilibrium of the two-
sector monopolistically competitive model cannot be solved recursively as in the competitive
framework since production and consumption decisions are linked through the markup pre-
vailing in the sheltered sector. Total diﬀerentiating equilibrium condition (20a) yields an
alternative representation of the rate of change of the relative price:











Equation (22) points out a key property of the model: in a general equilibrium framework
augmented with endogenous markups, the response of the relative price to technological and
ﬁscal shocks is not analogous to that observed in the Balassa-Samuelson model. Although the
two ﬁrst terms on the right-hand side of (22) correspond to the standard Balassa-Samuelson
eﬀect, the last term indicates additional eﬀects on relative prices operating through endoge-
nous changes in the markup. Therefore, the model assigns a critical role to variations in
markups as an additional driving force behind relative price changes. To understand this
feature, it is convenient to decompose the percentage change in the markup as follows:
ˆ µN = εK ˆ K + ε¯ λ
ˆ ¯ λ + εpˆ p + εAT ˆ AT + εAN ˆ AN + εgNˆ gN, (23)
where εk denotes the elasticity of the markup w.r.t. changes in variable k (with εK ≷ 0,
ε¯ λ ≷ 0, εAT > 0, εAN < 0 and εgN > 0). From (23), the imperfect substitutability of
non traded goods implies that productivity shocks have indirect eﬀects on the relative price
through the markup. These eﬀects can best be described using the example of a positive
productivity shock in the traded sector. By stimulating investment and consumption, this
shock decreases the importance of the public demand for non traded goods causing a decline
in the price elasticity and a corresponding increase in markups (as εAT > 0). Inspection of
(22) indicates that this reinforces the relative price appreciation in response to increases in
productivity in the traded sector. However, the direct eﬀect of ˆ AT, operating through the
ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (22), gives rise to feedback eﬀects on the markup since at
the same time, the productivity shock exerts a downward pressure on the markup (as εp < 0)
and so moderates the increase in relative prices. Given these potentially oﬀsetting eﬀects, it
is not trivial from the theoretical model to determine whether the endogenous response in
the markup operates against or in favor of the standard Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect. But it is
clear how this framework allows for a more generalized approach to the Balassa-Samuelson
hypothesis. In particular, if one assumes that markets are perfectly competitive when they
9are not, one can be led to misestimate the productivity bias hypothesis.10
In our model ﬁscal policy is not neutral. The present framework also provides a new
explanation for the pervasive evidence that government expenditures increases are associated
with relative price of nontradable appreciations. In this setup, all the eﬀects of government
expenditure changes on the relative price are channelled through markup’s variations. This
channel is not operative in the Balassa-Samuelson model due to the restrictive property
of perfect competition. Intuitively, an increase in government spending creates a negative
wealth eﬀect by lowering the households’ permanent income. This wealth eﬀect induces
the representative agent to consume less and work more and causes non traded output and
investment to increase. Consequently, the markup rises in response to declines in the private
part of aggregate demand for non traded goods. It originates from the fact that when public
demand increases, the relative importance of the price-elastic component of demand falls.11
4 Numerical results
We now analyze the full response of the relative price of nontradables to permanent shocks
to government spending and productivity.
4.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated for a plausible set of utility and production parameters in order
to be consistent with data of OECD economies. Following Cashin and McDermott’s [2003]
estimates for a sample of industrialized countries, the elasticity of substitution between
traded and non traded goods in consumption, φ, and the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution, σ, are set to 1.5 and 0.7 respectively. The parameter ϕ is computed so that the non
traded goods share in consumption α matches the empirical value of 45% (see Stockman and
Tesar’s [1995] estimates). Therefore, ϕ is ﬁxed to 0.5, implying no bias in consumption. The
benchmark calibration assumes σL = 0.3, value close to the mid-point of empirical studies
(see Blundell and MaCurdy [1999]). The scaling parameter of disutility of work, γ, is set
equal to 0.1, while the discount factor β is set such that households discount the future at
a 4% annual rate. The elasticity of substitution between varieties of non traded goods, θ,
is related to the steady-state value of the markup. The methodology developed by Roeger
[1995] applied to sectoral data from a sample of thirteen OECD economies provides consis-
tent estimates of µN (see Appendix A for details). To understand further the role played in
the model by the intensity of competition, a sensitivity analysis is performed with respect
to the price elasticity of demand for non tradables. Despite being a preference parameter,
θ parameterizes also the degree of competition in non traded goods markets as well (θ is
negatively related to the markup).12 Regarding production, sectoral output shares of labor
10By the same logic, TFP gains in sector N lead to deviations from the standard Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect.
11Moreover, ﬁscal shocks falling on non traded goods gN aﬀect the markup through two channels: a
composition eﬀect represented by the term εgN > 0, and a general equilibrium eﬀect due to the changes in
K, p and ¯ λ. By contrast, ﬁscal shocks gT aﬀects the markup only through the second eﬀect.
12In general, it is equivalent to vary competition by altering the numbers of ﬁrms in the monopolistic
market or by varying the degree of substitution between goods (see Jonsson [2007]).
10take two diﬀerent values depending on whether the traded sector is more or less capital
intensive than the non traded sector. When kT > kN, the values of αT and αN are set to
0.6 and 0.7 respectively, while the alternative situation, kN > kT, corresponds to αT = 0.7
and αN = 0.6. Finally, the depreciation rate of capital is set to 6%.
4.2 Fiscal shocks
Let us suppose that the small open economy is disturbed by a positive government spending
shock falling on the non traded good.13 The persistent shock, ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes,
is equal to 1% of output. Figures 1(a)-1(b) report the optimal steady-state response in the
relative price to this shock predicted by the model for diﬀerent values of the parameter θ.14
——————————————————————–
< Please insert Figure 1 about here >
——————————————————————–
An important prediction of the model is that the relative price appreciates after a positive
shock in domestic government purchases. Figures 1(a)-1(b) substantiate this analytical
outcome. Firms selling in non traded markets ﬁnd it optimal to raise markups because
the increase in aggregate demand stemming from the public sector renders the demand for
individual goods less price elastic. This generalized rise in domestic markups leads ultimately
to an appreciation of the relative price of non traded goods. This prediction of the model
is consistent with empirical evidence documenting an increase in relative prices consecutive
to an expansion in public consumption (see Froot and Rogoﬀ [1991], De Gregorio et al.
([1994a], [1994b]) and Balvers and Bergstrand [2002]). By contrast, the Balassa-Samuelson
setup counterfactually predicts that the relative price is completely unaﬀected by government
spending shocks. Another notable feature in Figures 1(a)-1(b) is that steady-state responses
depend on the elasticity of substitution θ. Not surprisingly, the higher is the value of θ, the
smaller is the markup and the closer are the responses of the relative price to the perfectly
competitive model. Indeed, by limiting the transmission of the ﬁscal shock through the
markup, increases in the elasticity of substitution soften the positive response of the relative
price to government spending policies.
4.3 Technological shocks
Figures 1(c)-1(f) plot the steady-state response of the relative price of non traded goods
to a one percent increase in productivity in sector T (Figures 1(c) and 1(d)) and in sector
N (Figures 1(e) and 1(f)) for diﬀerent values of the parameter θ. Dotted lines denote the
response of the small open economy in which all goods markets are perfectly competitive.
It corresponds therefore to the Balassa-Samuelson model or equivalently to equation (21).
Solid lines report the response of our imperfectly competitive two-sector framework and
capture the total impact of productivity shocks predicted by (22).
13For reason of space, we restricted attention to a rise in gN. Numerical results after a ﬁscal shock on gT
lead to qualitatively same results and are available from the author upon request.
14The responses are shown as percentage deviations from the initial steady state.
11In line with the intuition developed above, the response of the relative price to sector-
speciﬁc productivity shocks in the Balassa-Samuelson model is insensitive to changes in the
price-elasticity of non traded goods. Regardless of the level of the markup, shocks to traded
goods productivity by 1% lead to proportional one-for-one relative price appreciations. Pos-
itive shocks to TFP in the non traded goods sector result in a fall in the relative price,
the extent to which p depreciates depending upon the sectoral capital intensities. For the
benchmark calibration ˆ p = −0.86% if kT > kN and ˆ p = −1.17% if kN > kT. Now, consider
instead the steady-state response of the relative price in the present model. As it is apparent
in Figures 1(c)-1(f), the qualitative response of the relative price is the same in the model
where ˜ µN > 1 (the solid line) as in the Balassa-Samuelson setup in which ˜ µN equals one
(the dotted line). However, the quantitative eﬀects depend crucially on markups response.
Following a technological shock in the traded sector and for a given θ, the increase of the rel-
ative price is higher under imperfect competition. This result suggests that the inclusion of
endogenous market power magniﬁes the impact of technological shocks in the traded sector
on domestic prices via a positive response of markups. By contrast, in response to supply
shock in the non traded sector, the model suggests that gains in productivity translate into
lower markups and ﬁnally into higher relative price reductions. Therefore, a key implica-
tion of the model is that part of relative price’s movements triggered by a technological
improvement in either the traded or the non traded sector can be attributed to endogenous
variations of the markup. Because the latter responses to productivity shifts, in assessing
the inﬂuence of sector-speciﬁc technological shocks on relative prices, it is important to relax
the restrictive assumption of perfect competition, and to include goods-markets distortions
into the analysis. According to our results, the default to account for the markup induces
signiﬁcant downward-biased estimates of the eﬀects of sector-speciﬁc productivity shocks
to the relative price of non traded goods. Observe also that the magnitude of the bias
(in absolute terms) after productivity gains in the non traded sector is larger than that
estimated consecutive to a shock to productivity in the traded sector (28% versus 5% re-
spectively for the benchmark).15 The reason is that non traded output is more sensitive to
productivity improvements in sector N than in sector T. As a result, the larger variation in
Y N translates into a bigger ﬂuctuation in the composition of demand for non traded goods
and ultimately into a larger markup change. These model’s properties make two predic-
tions about the econometric analysis ran in section 5. First, the endogenous decrease in
the markup reinforces the fall in relative price in response to gains in productivity in sector
N and hence the coeﬃcient on productivity non tradables would decrease once we net out
market power adjustments since the markup captures some of the eﬀects of the productivity
improvements AN. Second and by contrast, the productivity of tradables operates relatively
weakly through the markup channel: its coeﬃcient is expected to be roughly identical when
we control for product market competition.
To illustrate further the role of the endogenous markups mechanism in propagating
technological shocks, we compute in Figures 1(g)-1(h) the reaction of the relative price
to an one percent increase in productivity in sector T relative to sector N (i.e. ˆ AT −
15The bias is approximated by (ˆ pBS − ˆ pM)/ˆ pM, where ˆ pBS (ˆ pM respectively) denotes the relative price
percentage deviation from steady-state in the Balassa-Samuelson model (our model respectively).
12ˆ AN = 1%). Comparing the magnitude of the response in the model to that observed
in the standard Balassa-Samuelson framework, we ﬁnd that the relative price increases
by less in the former model. As in the case of sector-speciﬁc productivity shocks, the
endogenous response of the markup introduces a new and potentially important channel for
the transmission of TFP diﬀerentials. When the markups adjustment is allowed for, the
relative price displays a sensitivity to productivity diﬀerentials smaller than in the perfectly
competitive framework. Accordingly, the failure to allow for variable markups leads to
overstate the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis in a perfectly competitive framework. This
delivers one implication for the following econometric analysis. The coeﬃcient associated
with the Balassa-Samuelson term, i.e. the ratio of relative productivity in tradables and
nontradables, is expected to be smaller once product market competition is controlled for.
5 Empirical analysis
In this section, we apply the model to study annual data for a panel of thirteen OECD
economies over the 1970-2004 period. Having derived testable implications for the relative
price of nontradables, our empirical strategy is now to confront the model with the data
in the most parsimonious way. We therefore refrain from adding explanatory variables
not derived from our model to the regressions. Since most of theoretical priors of the
model are based on long-run eﬀects of exogenous real shocks, the cointegration methodology
provides a convenient device for testing whether the implications of the model are supported
empirically.16 Given the relatively short time span (T = 35), it is convenient to apply non
stationary panel methods to increase the power of tests for unit roots and cointegration.
5.1 Econometric issues
Our theoretical model generalizes the Balassa-Samuelson framework in three ways. First,
by accounting for imperfect competition, it predicts that positive ﬁscal shocks appreciate
the relative price of non traded goods in the long-run. Second, technological shocks have ef-
fects that are not isomorphic to those obtained from the textbook Balassa-Samuelson setup.
This property results from the fact that the markup charged in the non traded sector is also
sensitive to gains in productivity. And third, controlling for product market competition,
inﬂuence of productivity shocks in nontradables and government spending would decrease,
while the one associated with productivity gains in the traded sector is expected to be
roughly identical. This suggests an empirical strategy that relates relative prices to produc-
tivity and ﬁscal shocks, and where we also search for diﬀerent impacts of these variables
when we control for product market competition. To assess whether these predictions are
16This approach allows us to account for non-stationarity in time series of relative prices. For instance,
Canzoneri et al. [1999], Kakkar [2003], Lee and Tang [2007] fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root.
13supported empirically, regressions of the following form are estimated:
pi,t = θ0i,t + β1 bsi,t + εi,t, (24a)
pi,t = θ0i,t + β0
1 bsi,t + β0
2 pmci,t + εi,t, (24b)
pi,t = θ0i,t + γ1 bsi,t + γ2 govi,t + εi,t, (24c)
pi,t = θ0i,t + γ0
1 bsi,t + γ0
2 govi,t + γ0
3 pmci,t + εi,t, (24d)
where i and t index country and time respectively, θ0i,t is a deterministic component (country
ﬁxed eﬀect and/or individual time eﬀect), bsi,t an indicator for the productivity eﬀect, govi,t
is government spending over GDP, pmci,t a proxy for goods market competition (all variables
are converted in natural logarithms) and εi,t is the i.i.d. error term.
Relation (24a) provides the general speciﬁcation of the Balassa-Samuelson model and
relates the relative price to the productivity diﬀerentials between the two sectors. We
estimate equation (24a) both with and without imposing that the coeﬃcients on productivity
in tradables and productivity in non tradables are equal in magnitude and opposite in
sign. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, the relative productivity term enters as a ratio: β1bsi,t =
β1 ln(AT
i,t/AN





i,t with a priori βT
1 6= βN
1 . The theoretical predictions are that
ˆ β1 > 0 or ˆ βT
1 > 0 and ˆ βN
1 > 0. Our model provides one reﬁnement to augment the standard
methodology to estimating equation such as (24a). The conventional Balassa-Samuelson
approach assumes that productivity shocks, constructed as Solow residuals, are exogenous
and uninﬂuenced by other factors. Indeed, under perfect competition, the Solow residual
is identical to the rate of Hicks-neutral technical progress. Due to the presence of market
power, it is unlikely, however, that true and measured productivity coincide, meaning that
the classical approach to measure productivity gains does not estimate the exact level of
technology progress. We therefore eschew conventional TFP measures because, within the
present context of imperfect competition, they are not in principle independent of ﬁscal
policy and goods-market competition degree, and on the contrary are crucially aﬀected
by them. This drawback of the Solow residual measure motivates our alternative, which
we refer to as market power-based Solow residual. This indicator, denoted by mptfp
j
i,t
is constructed by subtracting to the Solow residual (tfp
j







i,t)) weighted by labor’s share in revenue (α
j


















i,t is deﬁned as the percent change
in output less the percent change in inputs, where the diﬀerent inputs are weighted by their
factor shares.17 Using (25) to estimate technological progress instead of Solow eliminates
distortions due to the imperfect competition. To make equation (25) operational requires
an accurate estimate of markups at the sectoral level. A properly measure of ˆ µ
j
i is obtained
by applying the consistent Roeger’s [1995] methodology to our sectoral data set.
17The derivation of (25) is based on Hall [1988]. His key insight is to show that, under imperfect com-
petition, the Solow residual measures the sum of the pure technology component (a
j
i,t) and a labor-capital
ratio component (k
j











14Speciﬁcation (24b) is a more formal assessment of the theoretical model since it adds to
the benchmark regression an important variable of interest in this study, namely, a proxy
for product market competition in sector N relative to sector T (pmci,t). This variable
controls for the bias due to the omission of imperfect competition in the Balassa-Samuelson
model, that is the eﬀects of technological shocks on the relative price through the markup
channel. This alternative regression leads us to evaluate one critical implication of the
theoretical analysis. The model predicts that, omitting the product market competition,
biases upward the coeﬃcients on the ratio of relative productivities and on productivity
on nontradables, confounding the true direct eﬀects of technological shocks on the relative
price with the indirect eﬀects through markups variations. By contrast, the model has the
stark prediction that productivity gains in the traded sector entail only slight variations in
markups. Based on these considerations, we expect that 0 < ˆ β0
1 < ˆ β1 and 0 < ˆ β0N
1 < ˆ βN
1
and we should not expect ˆ β0T
1 to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from ˆ βT
1 .18 The equation (24c)
extends further the model by including the ﬁscal policy variable govi,t. In light of numerical
results, we hypothesize that ˆ γ2 > 0. Finally, speciﬁcation (24d) controls for product market
competition in sector N (relative to sector T) in regression (24c) and thus, encompasses the
strong implications of the theoretical model. Because ﬁscal shocks inﬂuence positively µN
in the model, one should expect markups to be positively correlated with relative prices.
Therefore, omitting the product market competition term should bias upward the coeﬃcient
on govi,t. So we expect ˆ γ0
3 > 0 and 0 < ˆ γ0
2 < ˆ γ2.
5.2 Data
We consider annual data taken from the sectoral KLEMS database. Data covers a maxi-
mum period from 1970 through 2004, for a total of thirteen industrialized countries and ten
industries.19 The country sample consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the US. Following De
Gregorio et al. [1994b], Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; Mining and Quarrying;
Total Manufacturing; Transport, Storage and Communication are classiﬁed as traded goods.
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply; Construction; Wholesale and Retail Trade; Hotels and
Restaurants; Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services; and Community Social
and Personal Services account for the non traded sector. KLEMS database contains data
on value added in current and constant prices, gross output, labor compensation, employ-
ment, and capital stock for each sector, permitting the construction of sectoral value-added
deﬂators and the derivation of sectoral TFP and market power-based Solow residual levels.
Given that competition cannot be measured directly, proxies of market power in sector N
relative to sector T (pmci,t) must be used. To this end, we consider two indicators which we
take as reasonable exogenous and have been widely used in the empirical literature.20 The
two empirical proxies gauge two diﬀerent concepts of imperfect competition: an indicator
measuring proﬁtability (pmc(π)i,t) and a proxy capturing the pricing behavior (pmc(p)i,t).
18In addition, another important issue for our estimation purposes is that the variable pmci,t enters
positively in the cointegration vector, i.e. we would expect ˆ β0
2 > 0.
19The data set and construction of variables are described in more details in Appendix A.
20See, among others, Gali [1994], Campa and Goldberg [1995], and Chen et al. [2009].
15Data required for the construction of pmc(π)i,t and pmc(π)i,t are extracted from the KLEMS
database. Finally, the ratio of government consumption spending to GDP is used to proxy
the variable govi,t (data are obtained from OECD’s National Accounts database).
5.3 Panel unit root tests results
Before turning to the estimation of the models, it may be appropriate to test the stochastic
properties of our variables. In order to test for the presence of unit root, we carry out the
panel tests proposed by Maddala and Wu [1999] and Im et al. [2003], with results displayed in
Table 1. With the exception of productivity in nontradables measured with Solow residuals
(tfpN), the null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative of trend stationarity can
not be rejected at conventional signiﬁcance levels. By applying the same tests to series in
ﬁrst diﬀerences, we strongly reject the null hypothesis of non stationarity in the panel for
all series at the 1% signiﬁcance level, suggesting that all variables are integrated of order
one. Taken together, unit root tests applied to the set of variables of interest show that non
stationarity is pervasive, making clear that pursue a cointegration analysis is appropriate.
——————————————————————–
< Please insert Table 1 about here >
——————————————————————–
To this end, we ﬁrst implement the Pedroni’s [2004] group parametric-t statistic test to
residuals from equations (24a)-(24d) to test for cointegration.21 Cointegrating relationships
are based on the group-mean fully modiﬁed OLS (FMOLS) procedure for cointegrated panel
proposed by Pedroni ([2000], [2001]). The group-mean FMOLS estimator allows for full
endogeneity of the regressors as well as heterogeneity of the dynamics among individuals, and
is superconsistent under cointegration. Moreover, the associated t-statistics are distributed
as standard normal.
5.4 Traditional estimates
Traditional estimates of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis investigate the eﬀects of relative
productivities on the relative price of non traded goods using conventional Solow residuals
to measure productivity gains. This leads to several speciﬁcations, depending on constraints
imposed on coeﬃcients on productivity in tradables and non tradables, i.e. whether AT and
AN enter the regression separately or as a ratio. Table 2 contains the results from estimating
reduced forms based on (24a).22
——————————————————————–
< Please insert Table 2 about here >
——————————————————————–
In all regressions, the Pedroni’s [1999] cointegration test rejects the null hypothesis of
no cointegration at the 1% level. In columns (1)-(3), the coeﬃcient on relative productivity
21Pedroni [2004] considers seven tests based on the estimated residuals. Four come from pooling data
along the within dimension and three are calculated pooling data along the between dimension. For small
time span, Pedroni’s [2004] simulations show that the group parametric-t statistic is the most powerful.
22To check the robustness of the results, we consider three alternative ratios: the basic one AT/AN, the
standard Balassa-Samuelson ratio [(AT)(αN/αT )]/AN and the model ratio AT/[(AN)(αT /αN)].
16in tradables and nontradables has the predicted sign and is highly signiﬁcant. Nonetheless,
the Balassa-Samuelson model is not completely successful. Indeed, it predicts not only that
p and relative productivities are cointegrated, but also that the slope of the cointegrating
vector should be equal to unity. In general, the slope coeﬃcients are fairly precisely estimated
and generally close to the unit implied by this model.23 However, the regressions in columns
(1) to (3) are valid only if coeﬃcient estimates on AT and AN are similar (in absolute
terms), this in turn justiﬁes the use of ratios of relative productivity in tradables and non
tradables. The results in columns (4) to (6) indicate that the restriction that the coeﬃcients
on AT and AN are similar in magnitude and opposite in sign is strongly rejected (see the
second test of coeﬃcient in Table 2). Because the coeﬃcient on productivity in tradables
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the coeﬃcient on productivity in nontradables (in absolute
terms), it is inappropriate to conclude that the Balassa-Samuelson model is successful just
because the regressions in columns (1) to (3) suggest a slope close to 1.0. Thus, the data
contradict one central prediction of the standard Balassa-Samuelson model that is shocks
to TFP diﬀerentials are fully transmitted to relative prices.
5.5 Alternatives estimates
Table 3 analyzes the eﬀects of productivity on relative prices for the present model and
repeats regressions behind Table 2. Because we are concerned about estimating impacts of
productivity diﬀerentials on relative prices without measurement errors, regressions (1) to
(3) use the market power-based Solow residuals instead of the Solow residuals.
——————————————————————–
< Please insert Table 3 about here >
——————————————————————–
For any measure of relative productivity, the cointegration test points to a rejection of
the null hypothesis of no cointegration, thus the relative price of non traded goods appears to
be cointegrated with mptfp diﬀerentials. Table 3 also reports the FMOLS estimates of the
coeﬃcient β. These estimates are positive and always statistically signiﬁcant, implying that
diﬀerentials in productivity between sectors T and N appreciate the relative price consistent
with model’s prediction. In all speciﬁcations, the restriction that the coeﬃcient on the
productivity term is equal to unity is strongly rejected at conventional levels. Although the
econometric analysis fails to obtain a unit cointegrating vector, it is premature to view this
drawback as a basis for rejecting the model. Indeed, the present framework suggests that
an increase in the relative productivity diﬀerential appreciates the relative price, but, to the
extent that markups also respond to sector-speciﬁc productivity shocks, it does not predict
that the two variables are proportional in the long-run. Moreover, tests of coeﬃcients
equality in columns (4) to (6) suggest that perfect symmetry in the eﬀects of tradables
and nontradables productivities is rejected at standard conﬁdence levels. Hence, there is
strong evidence that the coeﬃcient estimates on productivities in sectors T and N have
diﬀerent magnitudes (as predicted by the model) when using the market power-based Solow
23See the ﬁrst test of coeﬃcient on the bottom half of Table 2 which shows that the evidence in favor of
the restriction β = 1.0 is quite strong in columns (1) and (2).
17residuals measure. In an attempt to assess the importance of the choice of the productivity
measure, the last row of Table 3 reports the p-values of the restriction that the coeﬃcients
estimated from the Balassa-Samuelson model (ˆ βBS, see Table 2) and those estimated in the
model (ˆ βM) are equal in magnitude. In all speciﬁcations, these coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent. Hence, tfp and mptfp measures are not interchangeable. This result reﬂects
the inherent diﬀerence between two measures of productivity gains used. In particular, tfp
proxy is not exogenous to imperfect competition and investment and labor dynamics, while
mptfp is free from the possibly endogenous variations in these variables. One implication
of this is that standard estimates of the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect using tfp data are likely
to be biased due to a measurement error in Solow residuals.24
The results in Tables 2 and 3 suggest also that the outstanding speciﬁcation is the one in
which productivity terms in tradables and non tradables enter separately since coeﬃcients
on AT and AN cannot be constrained to be equal in magnitude. Hence, our benchmark
speciﬁcation, in what follows, includes productivity terms separately and both AT and AN
are measured with mptfp (see column (4) in Table 3). This speciﬁcation is expanded in
Table 4 to incorporate the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy and market product competition on the
relative price. This approach allows a strict test of the model’s implications. For comparison
purpose, column (1) simply restates the benchmark regression (4) in Table 3. FMOLS results
suggest that a 1% increase in productivity in the traded sector raises the relative price by
0.77%, while a 1% shock to nontradables productivity leads to a fall in p by 0.95%.25
Regressions in columns (2) to (6) are the empirical counterparts to theoretical equations
(24b), (24c) and (24d). Two aspects of the results support the present model.
——————————————————————–
< Please insert Table 4 about here >
——————————————————————–
First, the coeﬃcient on the market product competition proxy has the correct sign and
is signiﬁcant at the one percent level. In other words, low competition degree in non traded
sector (relative to sector T) exerts an upward pressure on relative prices of non traded
goods. According to the two ﬁrst tests of coeﬃcients’ equality displayed in the bottom
half of Table 4, the competition variable also reduces greatly and signiﬁcantly the size of
the coeﬃcient on productivity in nontradables while the coeﬃcient on AT is statistically
unaﬀected by the presence of the competition measure as the model would have predicted.
This stresses the importance of controlling for imperfect competition when estimating the
inﬂuence of productivity shocks on relative prices. To the extent that non traded ﬁrms
have a substantial market power, the response of markups to an increase in AN erodes the
beneﬁts of disinﬂation eﬀects associated with positive technological shocks in that sector.
Less competitive economies tend, therefore, to experience higher nontradables inﬂation since
the transmission mechanisms of positive shocks to productivity in sector N into relative
price reductions are weaker. It is also interesting to note that the estimated biases due to
24The biases introduced by measurement error can be rather severe, especially with ﬁxed eﬀect estimates.
See Griliches and Hausman [1986] and references therein.
25These estimates are not directly comparable with those found in the previous literature, because of the
diﬀerent productivity measures employed.
18the failure to allow for imperfect competition are in a similar order of magnitude to those
computed from the theoretical model. The diﬀerences in the estimated coeﬃcients on AT
and AN in regressions which include the product competition term (columns (2) to (3)) and
estimates of the basic model without this variable (regression (1)) represent the outcome of
the bias. On the basis of these estimates, we ﬁnd that the bias reaches 4% for for shocks to
AT and 24% for for shocks to AN. These values are consistent with numerical calculations
which provide theoretical biases equal to 5% for AT and 28% for AN.
Second, the coeﬃcient on ﬁscal policy, in regressions (4) to (6), has the predicted sign
and is highly signiﬁcant. These point estimates suggests that an one percentage point shock
to the share of government expenditure increases the relative price of nontradables by 0.32 to
0.60 percent. These results accord with the qualitative predictions of the theoretical analysis.
One another important aspect of the model is that goods market competition degree aﬀects
also the strength of eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on the relative price. This prediction is tested
and conﬁrmed in columns (5) and (6) which reports the results from regressing the relative
prices on sectoral productivities, government spending and market product competition. In
both cases, the coeﬃcient on ﬁscal policy is signiﬁcantly lower from the one obtained in the
regression (4) without competition proxy.
6 Conclusion
This paper calls into question the conventional wisdom that relative price trends observed
in industrialized countries are entirely governed by the response of economy’s supply-side
to divergence of productivity levels in traded and non traded goods sectors. On the theo-
retical side, we provide a reappraisal of the static theory of Balassa [1964] and Samuelson
[1964] by embedding their approach in an explicitly dynamic general equilibrium setting
featuring monopolistic competition and endogenous markups. In such framework, markups
vary in response to shifts in the composition of demand for non traded goods and optimal
intertemporal plans of households and government’s decisions have the potential to aﬀect
the relative price of nontradables. The model emphasizes therefore the role of markups in
the propagation of macroeconomic shocks implying that responses of the relative price to
both technological and ﬁscal disturbances into the framework have little in common with
those observed in the classical Balassa-Samuelson economy. First, the presence of endoge-
nous markups is shown to make ﬁscal policy non-neutral. Second, the eﬀects of productivity
shocks are not analogous to those derived in the Balassa-Samuelson setting, suggesting that
the latter framework tends to misidentify the inﬂuence of sector-speciﬁc productivity shocks.
The empirical part of the paper converts the model into a form that is directly amenable
to econometric analysis. In particular, we check whether the imperfect competition hy-
pothesis (and its resulting outcomes) aﬀects the relative price of nontradables in a manner
consistent with theory. The econometric results illustrate the robustness of the theoretical
ﬁndings. First, we show that, for an appraisal of the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect, the choice of
the productivity measure can lead to diﬀerent conclusions regarding the performance of the
underlying model. Based on Solow residuals to proxy eﬃciency gains, the textbook Balassa-
Samuelson hypothesis is not completely successful. By contrast, the market power-based
19Solow residuals seem to be the more appropriate and preferred measure of productivity
gains, being exogenous from inﬂuence of endogenous variations in markups. Moreover, our
estimations highlight that the failure to control for imperfect competition induces substan-
tial biases in the eﬀects of productivity shocks to nontradables on the relative price. And
second, we stress the importance of additional real factors inﬂuencing relative prices in the
long-run. In particular, our empirical ﬁndings point out the potential disinﬂation gains
originating from deregulation policies, while, in contrast, expansive ﬁscal policies tend to
fuel nontradables inﬂation. On the whole, the paper’s theoretical and empirical ﬁndings
underscore that one must go beyond the textbook Balassa-Samuelson framework to capture
overall dynamics of relative prices over time and across countries.
A Appendix: data construction
In what follows, subscript i refers to country, k industry, t time and j sector (j = T,N).
Deﬁne value-added measured at current prices (V A) and value-added volume (V AV ) for

















k,i,t resp.) is the value-added measured at current prices (value-added volume resp.)
for industry k classiﬁed in sector j. All prices are value-added deﬂators: P
j





The relative price of non traded goods for country i is therefore deﬁned by Pi,t = PN
i,t/PT
i,t.
Productivity indexes are computed by averaging industry-speciﬁc indicators with a weight-
ing scheme based on the share of each industry k in the total value added of the sector j. To-











k,i,t is the TFP for industry k classiﬁed in sector j and where the weights (ω
j
k,i,t)
are based on the size of value-added of each industry k, that is ω
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k ∈ j. Total factor productivity index for industry k is computed assuming Cobb-Douglas
production functions: TFP
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resp.) is the total employment (capital resp.) and α
j
k,i is labor share in total income aver-
aged over the period 1970-2004 in industry k.
We compute the market power-based Solow residual, denoted by MPTFP
j
k,i,t, by em-
ploying a two-step estimation strategy. The ﬁrst step consists in estimating a markup over
marginal costs in industry k classiﬁed in sector j. For this purpose, we apply the Roeger’s







































k,i,t are the shares of labor and mate-
rials costs in the value of gross output respectively. ∆GO
j
k,i,t denotes the nominal out-
put growth, ∆MI
j
k,i,t the growth in nominal intermediate input costs and ∆(ri,tK
j
k,i,t)
the nominal capital cost growth for industry k classiﬁed in sector j. All these variables
are compiled from the KLEMS database except the user cost of capital ri,t. No sector-
speciﬁc information is available to construct ri,t, so the rental price of capital is estimated







i,t is the deﬂator for business non residential in-
vestment, ii,t the long-term nominal interest rate, πGDP
i,t the GDP deﬂator based inﬂation
20rate and the depreciation rate δ is ﬁxed at 5% throughout (pI
i,t, ii,t and πGDP
i,t are taken
from OECD databases). To tackle the potential endogeneity of the regressor and the het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the error term, equation (A1) is estimated by using
heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard errors as suggested by Newey and
West [1993] (lag truncation = 2). The markup estimate in industry k classiﬁed in sector
j, namely ˆ µ
j
k,i, is equal to 1/(1 − ˆ δ
j
k,i). Markup indexes of traded and non traded sectors










k,i stands for the pe-
riod average share of industry k in the total value-added of the sector j. A special note
should be made for ”Community Social and Personal Services” industries. Output in this
industry is produced to a signiﬁcant extent by non-market producers (government or other
non-proﬁt ﬁrms). Therefore, estimates of the markup for those industries might not be
always meaningful and we do not take into account ”Community Social and Personal Ser-
vices” when calculating markups for the non traded goods sector ˆ µN
i . In the second step,
we use the estimated markups ˆ µ
j














k,i−1). Market power-based Solow residual









Regarding the demand side-eﬀect, we use the ratio of government consumption spending
to GDP: GOVi,t = GSi,t/GDPi,t, where GSi,t denotes government consumption expenditure
and GDPi,t is the gross domestic product of country i. We consider two empirical proxies
for product market competition: a proxy measuring proﬁtability and a proxy capturing the











i,t. The pricing behavior index is calculated as the inverse of the
labor income share (excluding the imputed labor income of the self-employed) in sector j:
comp(p)
j








i,t), where total employees (N
j
i,t) and employment
or equivalently persons engaged (L
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k,i,t resp.) is total employees (employment resp.)
in industry k classiﬁed in sector j. To be consistent with the general lessons of the model,
the product market competition indicator (PMCi,t) is rescaled according to: PMC(π)i,t =
comp(π)N
i,t/comp(π)T
i,t and PMC(p)i,t = comp(p)N
i,t/comp(p)T
i,t. A rise in PMC(π)i,t (or
PMC(p)i,t) indicates that the market power in sector N increases relative to that observed
in the traded sector.
By using the translation of notations xi,t = logXi,t, we then obtain the variables involved
in regressions (24): pi,t, tfpi,t, mptfpi,t, govi,t, pmc(π)i,t and pmc(π)i,t.
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Figure 1: Impulse response to ﬁscal and technological shocks
23Table 1: Panel unit root tests results (p-values)
Variable Level First Diﬀerences
IPS MW IPS MW
p 0.91 0.79 0.00 0.00
tfp
T 0.38 0.44 0.00 0.00
mptfp
T 0.26 0.76 0.00 0.00
tfp
N 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
mptfp
N 0.42 0.13 0.00 0.00
tfp
T/tfp
N 0.36 0.87 0.00 0.00
mptfp
T/mptfp




















αN 0.92 0.98 0.00 0.00
gov 0.37 0.47 0.00 0.00
pmc(p) 0.54 0.60 0.00 0.00
pmc(π) 0.12 0.24 0.00 0.00
Notes: IPS and MW denote respectively the p-values of the Im, Pesaran
and Shin’s [2003] Wtbar test and the Maddala and Wu’s [1999] P test
(based on Phillips-Perron p-values) for the null hypothesis of a unit root.
Country-speciﬁc intercept and time trend were included in both tests.
Table 2: Relative price and productivity (Balassa-Samuelson model)





















































Observations 449 449 449 449 449 449
ˆ β = 1.0 0.10 0.07 0.03
ˆ β
T = −ˆ β




c denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The measure of the
technological progress is based on Solow residuals A
j = tfp
j, j = T,N. All regressions
include a ﬁxed eﬀect and subtract out common time eﬀects. ˜ Z
∗
t denotes the Pedroni’s
[1999] group parametric-t test for the null hypothesis of no cointegration (the 1%, 5%
and 10% critical values are -2.33, -1.64 and -1.28 respectively). The last two rows report
the p-values of the tests of coeﬃcients’ equality.
24Table 3: Relative price and productivity (the model)





















































Observations 449 449 449 449 449 449
ˆ β = 1.0 0.00 0.00 0.00
ˆ β
T = −ˆ β
N 0.00 0.00 0.00
ˆ β
M = ˆ β




c denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The measure of the
technological progress is based on market power-based Solow residuals A
j = mptfp
j,
j = T,N. All regressions include a ﬁxed eﬀect and subtract out common time eﬀects.
˜ Z
∗
t denotes the Pedroni’s [1999] group parametric-t test for the null hypothesis of no
cointegration (the 1%, 5% and 10% critical values are -2.33, -1.64 and -1.28 respectively).
The last three rows report the p-values of the tests of coeﬃcients’ equality.
Table 4: Relative price, productivity, ﬁscal policy and competition













































t -3.31a -3.03a -2.42a -3.16a -2.47a -2.21a
Observations 449 449 449 449 449 449
ˆ βT(1) = ˆ βT(i) 0.29 0.02 0.16 0.08 0.12
ˆ βN(1) = ˆ βN(i) 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00




c denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The measure of the technological
progress is based on market power-based Solow residuals A
j = mptfp
j, j = T,N. All regres-
sions include a ﬁxed eﬀect and subtract out common time eﬀects. ˜ Z
∗
t denotes the Pedroni’s
[1999] group parametric-t test for the null hypothesis of no cointegration (the 1%, 5% and 10%
critical values are -2.33, -1.64 and -1.28 respectively). The last three rows report the p-values of
the tests of coeﬃcients’ equality.
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